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1 This essay sets up a dialogue between discourses in the self-narrative of an irregular
cavalryman (deli) Deli Mustafa that recounts the campaigns he took part from 1801/2 to
1825 and corpus of Ottoman archival sources written about Kara Feyzi,  an irregular
soldier (sekbân) and bandit leader who marshaled a successful, trans-regional organized
crime  network  that  pillaged  Ottoman  Rumeli  from  1793  to  1823.  Deli  Mustafa,  or
Kabudlı el-Haccî Vasfî Efendi1 as he is fashioned on the title page of the only surviving
manuscript of his narrative, provides rare glimpses into the tumultuous everyday life
and  moral  dilemmas  faced  by  countless  Ottoman  irregular  soldiers,  or  “military
laborers,” who hailed from the Muslim peasantry and joined paramilitary bands either
for social mobility or protection against similar types of bands that roamed the Empire
during  this  period.2 Deli  Mustafa’s  narrative  and  self-fashioning  strategies  help  us
understand what common Muslim men serving as itinerate soldiers had to do to make a
living during this tumultuous period of Ottoman history, and most important, how they
understood and explained their contentious ways of life as honorable and legitimate
based on a common understanding of a masculine ethos and aesthetic shared by groups
across social divides.3
2 In  contrast,  the  corpus  of  official  correspondence  about  Kara  Feyzi  reveals  his
spectacular trajectory from a common, itinerate soldier like Deli Mustafa into a wily
bandit leader and imperial power broker. It also tells a larger story about how imperial
governance  came  to  depend  on  wide-spread  networks  of  violence  but  became
imbricated in their criminal activities during this period of Ottoman history. In the era
of chronic wars with the Habsburg and Russian Empires, Kara Feyzi represented a new
generation of Muslim warrior-entrepreneurs whose violent ways were once sanctioned
by the state along its Danubian border to police these spaces and defend attacks against
foreign armies during inter-imperial wars. However, by the late eighteenth century,
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especially during peacetime, they became agents of social disruption whose excesses
gradually became a fact of everyday life.4 Different kinds of officials running the gamut
from local a‘yân (notables) to prominent vezîrs (imperial ministers) documented this
transformation over  time in  numerous dispatches  they sent  to  Istanbul  about  Kara
Feyzi. Together, this large corpus of sources sheds light on a repertoire of narrative
strategies and tropes to which officials resorted to rationalize as well as mask their
shady  but  often  lucrative  dealings  with  a  man  whom  they  nevertheless  publically
stigmatized as the enemy of the faith and state (hâ’inü’d-dîn ü devlet). Kara Feyzi and
Deli Mustafa’s stories complement each other as they juxtapose a common irregular
soldier’s  strategies of  self-fashioning vis-à-vis imperial  officials  with the these same
types of officials’ strategies of fashioning themselves vis-à-vis irregular soldier/bandits
and, in the process, reflect all of these groups’ own professional identities, concern for
their  reputations,  and  shared  angst.  Together,  they  shed  light  on  much  larger
interpretative and moral communities forged upon the same kinds of “texts,” narrative
strategies, group experiences, exchange of material and symbolic resources, or simply a
concept like honor woven throughout the narratives discussed below.
3 The concept of  honor and shame in the social  sciences as envisioned by twentieth-
century anthropologists of the Mediterranean has been the source of much controversy
and criticism. Most criticisms revolve around the fact that honor and shame have been
portrayed  as  timeless,  immutable  social  structures  throughout  the  Mediterranean,
which, in turn, served as the basis for specious theories about the unity of the region
(Albera 2006).5 However, this homogeneity was often based on superficial comparisons
and assumed a priori rather than demonstrated (Herzfeld 1984). Skeptics have pointed
out that the reification of the concept in anthropology was also rooted in northern
European  political  agendas  that  sought  to  justify  disparities  of  power  in  European
politics  and  economy:  the  anthropologists’  formulation  of  a  rural,  patriarchal,
libidinous,  mustached,  always-ready-to-act-violently-on-honor  Mediterranean  male
conveniently served to justify the southern man’s inferior position (Pina-Cabral 1989).
It  has also been argued that  in societies  whose relations were analyzed by modern
anthropologists in terms of honor and shame, the very subjects of research did not use
these exact words in their own languages.6
4 Terms  for  honor  only  seldom  appear  in  late  eighteenth-  and  nineteenth-century
Ottoman sources.  Ottoman officials  sometimes  used  the  terms ‘ırz (honor),  ehl-i  ‘ırz
zümresinden (from  among  honorable  men),  and  edeb (good  behavior;  politeness),
alongside their opposites like hetk-i ‘ırz (violation of honor), ehl-i şakavât zümresinden
(men of evil stratagems), as well as edebsiz (without breeding) in their reports regarding
Kara Feyzi’s network but usually to describe bandit leaders’ behavior in general and
almost  never  in  relation  to  the  sexual  violence  that  came  with  their  much  larger
repertoire of crime. In contrast, in Bulgarian and Serbian sources chest/chast (honor) as
well as obezchesten/obezčašćen (dishonored) appear in local sources that referred to Kara
Feyzi’s  network’s  specific  attacks  on  local  communities  and  their  excesses  against
Christian  maidens  (Nachev,  Fermandjiev  1984:  239-240;  Manolova-Nikolova,  1999),
which suggests that while local communities were concerned with the honor of their
womenfolk,  this  was  neither  the kind of  honor nor part  of  the bigger  picture that
concerned  imperial  officials  or  the  imperial  center  when  it  came  to  Kara  Feyzi’s
insurgency.  Rather  than  getting  caught  up  in  the  semantics  of  honor  and  related
concepts, this essay builds on recent historiography that revisits honor as a discourse
that  imperial  officials,  subjects,  warriors,  irregulars,  and  bandits  all  invoked  in
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everyday relations as well  as crisis.  As opposed to approaching honor as something
confined  to  individuals  and  face-to-face  relations  in  rural  communities,  this  essay
approaches honor as  a  collective and institutional  discourse that  reflects  the world
views  and  apprehensions  of  broader  interpretative  and  moral  communities  (Taylor
2011: 309). As Leslie Peirce points out in her contribution to this edition, honor and its
constituent  components  such  as  shame,  reputation,  loyalty,  fairness,  honesty,  and
probity are relational concepts in that it takes communities to bestow or deny them to
social  actors.  Indeed,  this  paper  is  concerned  with  these  larger,  trans-regional
communities while being careful not to reify honor as something that can be harnessed
by the state or one particular group.
5 It  argues that honor and its relational components provide a flexible framework to
study  the  ways  in  which  sundry  communities  coped  with  endemic  violence  and
multiple centers of  power wielding (il)legitimate force in late Ottoman society.  The
concepts of honor embedded or implied in the narratives that will be discussed below
reveal how different social groups made claims, competed for limited resources and
status, negotiated what was right and wrong, and forged conflicting partnerships and
allegiances with one another—however transient—for common pursuits. Rather than
emphasizing  honor  as  the  mechanism  of  social  organization  in  the  absence  of  the
reaches of the modern state, this essay illuminates the ways in which the discourse of
honor (and its relational components) mediated the integration of individuals, groups,
and local communities into much larger entities such as trans-regional networks and
the structures of the state, since different manifestations of the state were ubiquitous
in  all  of  the  disparate  encounters  reconstructed  below.7 As  it  will  be  argued,  the
reliance of imperial governance on the trans-regional networks of violence to police
and  defend  society  resulted  in  a  precarious  intimacy  that  conventionalized  the
unconventional, insubordinate behavior of vast echelons of Ottoman society, making
violent behavior a marker of prestige and masculinity. 
 
The Trope of Unemployment and Trans-Regional
Networks of Violence
6 Parts of Deli Mustafa’s self-narrative in which he recalls his adventures in the Morea
during the Greek Revolution (1821-1829) read like “rites of passage” into manhood in
which a young warrior proudly boasts of beheading infidel (kâfir) insurgents, pillaging
their communities, and enslaving their womenfolk—acts that would have won him the
respect  of his  comrades,  father  (who  accompanied  him  throughout  his  travels),
commanders,  and other target audiences of  his  narrative.8 Deli  Mustafa emphasizes
extreme forms of ritualistic violence and vengeance that he claims he visited onto his
Christian  adversaries,  and  he  also  boasts  of  daring  risks  he  took  whilst  skillfully
avoiding the same type of humiliation that he claims his cunning Greek adversaries
sought to inscribe upon him and the Muslim community in general. 
7 Throughout his account of his earlier journeys in Anatolia where he fought against
rebellious paşas, bandits, or Kurdish tribes, however, Deli Mustafa makes only vague
references to similar types of  violence that his  larger network wielded upon fellow
Muslims.  This  suggests  that  the  author  understood  the  Greek  Revolution  to  be  a
legitimate context for him to describe the full repertoire of the ritualistic violence and
pillaging that men like him visited upon Ottoman society as a whole less discriminately.
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A careful reading of Deli Mustafa’s account reveals the narrator’s greater concerns with
tensions and animosities within the Muslim community itself;  the Greek Revolution
merely permitted him to outline the building blocks of his masculine aesthetic with
impunity.  In particular,  his  account points to the larger struggles itinerate military
forces had with their Muslim commanders as well as other ranks of soldiery like the
Janissaries.  It  is  in  these  descriptions  running  the  gamut  of  trust,  deception,  and
multiple,  conflicting  loyalties  that  marked  relations  among  Muslim  paramilitary
networks, imperial commanders, and sundry local communities that one sees how the
discourse of honor was crucial in governing social relations across communities and
social groups.
8 Narratives like this combined with Ottoman archival sources give us insight into how
men  like  Deli  Mustafa  and  Kara  Feyzi  positioned  themselves  in  relation  to  their
immediate divisions or bands, larger, trans-regional networks, as well as the state. In
this sense, Deli Mustafa’s self-narrative resembles the narratives of police officials that
Noemi Levy-Aksu focuses on in her contribution to this  collection of  essays in that
honor was a central value around which the narrator promoted himself as well as his
larger network of itinerate warriors who became the backbone of the Ottoman war
machine and internal  policing mechanisms yet were denied the professional  status,
pay,  and  dignity  of  traditional  military  bodies  such  as  the  Janissaries.  It  is  in  this
context that one should understand Deli Mustafa’s rhetoric of inclusion and exclusion
on  moral  grounds,  for  he  constantly  juxtaposes  himself  and  his  delî comrades  as
honorable, loyal men concerned with protecting and upholding the faith and state to
the  ruthless  stratagems  of  dishonorable  Janissaries  and  imperial  commanders  who
were all out for their own interests.
9 For instance,  in an anecdote from his  campaigns during the Greek Revolution,  Deli
Mustafa  describes  how he and his  companions  (along with dozens  of  female  Greek
captives they had acquired earlier) came upon insurgents near Kûmiye (Kymi, on the
island of Euboea). After defeating and decapitating some of them, Mustafa and his men
proceeded back to their camp with female slaves, the heads of insurgents, as well as
what he claims were five thousand of  their sheep.  However,  when they came upon
Janissaries on the road, things immediately went awry when an enraged Janissary ağa 
(leader)who had his  eyes on their loot complained that irregulars like the narrator
were moving in on places ahead of the Janissaries and claiming first dibs on the Greek
booty. Deli Mustafa adds that the ağa ordered his men to hold up Deli Mustafa and his
comrades  at  gunpoint  and  confiscate  their  booty.  In  addition  to  stealing  all  of  his
female captives, decapitated Greek heads, and animals, Deli Mustafa also laments that
the Janissaries robbed him of his horse, rendering him a simple foot soldier (...hemân
piyâde kaldım; Ms. Or. 1551, 113a).9
10 Deli Mustafa recalls another episode in which Janissaries directly sullied his and his
companions’ honor, when they caught them conversing with Greek insurgents. After
mocking Mustafa and his comrades by saying they feared infidels and were not worthy
of the sultan’s bread, one of Mustafa’s insulted companions allegedly charged against
the insurgents’ trench on a horse unarmed, and as a result, was immediately shot dead
off  his  horse:  “...kâfirden  korkaruz  dimişler  idi  ve  padişah  etmeği (sic.  ekmeği)  sizlere
harâmdır dimişler idi...,” (ibid.: 72a-72b). Thus, Deli Mustafa’s encounters with menacing
Janissaries were not only just as dangerous as those with Greek insurgents, but they
also speak to the ubiquitous problem non-salaried irregulars faced: though the imperial
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war machine relied on these men to police and defend the Empire, imperial elites and
rival  Janissaries  denied  these  men  professional  status  and  respect,  in  addition  to
symbolic  and  material  benefits  they  felt  they  were  entitled  to.  The  reader  of  Deli
Mustafa’s text can surmise that one’s honor was something which men defended at all
costs.
11 What can be discerned from Deli Mustafa’s tales of his exploits as well as bad luck in
keeping his booty is that they were inherently connected to his commanders’ running
vast trading networks of booty, slaves, and even body parts that they accumulated from
different ranks of soldiery to sell to other networks in order to line their own pockets.10
Men like Deli Mustafa could not possibly deal with the logistics of such a vast enterprise
and were thus the “wholesalers” that  fed this  much larger,  lucrative economy. But
being on the ground as a “wholesaler” was marked by brutal competition among the
different ranks of Muslim soldiery, and it is in this context that one must consider the
overall meaning of Deli Mustafa’s narration of his heroics.
12 Among the hardships that Deli Mustafa laments the most, however, unemployment on
account  of  treacherous  commanders  who  frequently  abandoned  him  and  his
companions features most in the text. This comes out most clearly in his account of
travels in Anatolia where irregulars did not have license to pillage local communities to
make a living as freely they did in the Morea. The narrator’s discussion of this issue
hints at how irregular forces understood their position as both contested commodities
in inter-elite imperial intrigues and victims of the same whose suffering justified their
collectively  contentious ways.  For  instance,  the narrator  once explains  that  he and
entire communities of his comrades were left unemployed (“kapusuz,” i.e., without a
patron) on account of their commanders’ deceit. They were, therefore, forced to roam
eastern and central Anatolia “from this village to that village” (bu köyde şu köyde) to get
by (Ms. Or. 1551, 13a). The trope of unemployment duplicitously imposed upon them
became  an  important  bond  between  not  only  Deli  Mustafa  and  his  immediate
companions in his division but also a vast community of Muslim itinerate warrior and
bandit orders that spoke the same language of oppression across the entire Empire. 
13 On this note, Deli Mustafa also reflects upon what he considered the “legitimate” as
opposed  to  “illegitimate”  plundering  of  local  communities  and  blurry  boundaries
between banditry and the necessity of survival. He distinguishes between elite officials
labeled “outlaws” (fermânlı, those whose recalcitrance elicited an imperial edict against
them) versus  local,  common “robbers”  (harâmî,  those  engaged in  unlawful  activity)
whom they encountered in skirmishes and battles throughout Anatolia. However, when
it came to his and his companions’ “roaming” Anatolia for sustenance, he is completely
mum regarding what specific forms of coercion they exerted to expropriate food and
resources  from  local  populations.  His  account  suggests  that  the  itinerate  soldiers’
“roaming” without patrons became sort of an “accepted” practice since their superiors
clearly  realized  that  their  bamboozling  their  men out  of  pay  would  result  in  their
oppressing the local populations.
14 Deli  Mustafa’s  recurrent  talk  of  unemployment  on  account  of  being  treated
dishonorably by elites, a feature also implicit in the corpus of sources revolving around
Kara Feyzi’s insurgency, was of a special order: it was a key element in the discourse of
a military laborer ethos, and as such, should be interpreted ideologically rather than
literally.  For  instance,  in  his  work  on  the  sheep  rustling  and  violence  of  highland
pastoral  communities  in  twentieth-century  Crete,  Michael  Herzfeld  points  out  how
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Cretan shepherds constantly manipulated tensions between local (village and Cretan)
and national ethics in their everyday discourse, a rhetoric of self-justification balanced
against self-recognition, through evoking an “ideology of hunger.” Cretan highlander
communities  were  well  aware  that  their  activities  invoked  official  disapproval  and
punitive action. But they also maintained that animal theft was a particular feature of a
klepht (i.e., nineteenth-century Greek bandit/freedom-fighter) ethos that was fashioned
in Greek national narratives as the single-most important factor that helped undermine
Turkish  domination  in  the  nineteenth  century.  In  this  sense,  their  cheerful
insubordination against state laws and authority emphasizes their identity through the
poetics of theft and narration of their community as mountain dwellers whose culture
was crucial for establishing the Greek nation and placed them beyond the reproach of
government  authorities  (Herzfeld  1985:  21).  Indeed,  what  is  striking  is  how  this
masculine ethos still discernible in Cretan communities in the twentieth-century was
predicated upon appropriating the memory of ambiguous historical groups (i.e.,
klephts) that functioned very much like their Muslim counterparts that Deli Mustafa
represented.
15 Whilst  describing  how  he  and  thousands  of  irregulars  were  the  victims  of  their
superiors’  intrigue  and  abuse,  however,  Deli  Mustafa  also  boasts  about  how  the
paramilitary contingents to which he belonged were savvy networks capable of dealing
with adversity brought onto them by their superiors and taking full advantage of their
position  as  “contested  commodities.”  Put  simply,  their  strategy  consisted  of
entertaining, soliciting, and accepting more advantageous employment propositions of
rival factions, be they elite paşas or infamous “robbers.” Itinerate warriors hedged their
bets by talking with individuals and groups at war with one another, and loyalties could
shift at any given moment because imperial officials and bandit bosses alike depended
on  them  for  manpower.11 To  everyone  involved,  these  volatile  exchanges  were
constitutive of customary, acceptable behavior, which again highlights the precarious
intimacy of governance and crime during this period of Ottoman history. For instance,
while he and his companions lay under siege in Ardanuç castle under the patronage of
a certain Baba Paşa stationed in nearby Erzurum, Deli Mustafa relates that one of their
assailants, a local strongman named Kara Kadı began communicating with them and
offered them clemency (bizlerere’y verüb) by giving them food, shelter, and presumably
better pay in return for abandoning their positions at the castle. Deli Mustafa casually
notes that he and his companions accepted the overtures of their assailant and moves
on, but shortly afterwards he points out that Baba Paşa did in fact abandon him and
15,000 other irregulars (Schmidt 2002: 192). This episode points to the fact that these
types  of  soldiery  clearly  understood  their  position  as  men  whose  skills  were  very
marketable in Ottoman society.12 This is what put them in a position to negotiate better
deals, salaries, and access to plunder for themselves if need be, thus prompting one to
take the narrator’s recurring trope of victimhood and unemployment with a grain of
salt.
16 The  dynamics  Deli  Mustafa  conveys  as  common  survival  tactics  for  vast  groups  of
military laborers compares well with similar dynamics that marked the career of Kara
Feyzi a couple of decades earlier on the other side of the Empire in northern Rumeli.
For example, in October 1795 the Protector of Belgrade (belgrad muhâfızı) reported that
the retinue of Kara Feyzi was pillaging communities on his path to take the city in
conjunction with rebellious Janissaries exiled from the region because their plundering
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of  the  local  population was  no longer  condoned by  the  Ottoman government  after
1791-92 when peace with the Habsburgs and Russians was made (B.O.A. HH 2402C). But
what stands out in the paşa’s  correspondence is  the fluid nature of  the boundaries
between his  own military forces  and Kara Feyzi’s  network,  betraying the perpetual
challenge officials faced in their efforts to recruit reliable forces to fight Kara Feyzi’s
insurgency. In this case El-Hac Mustafa Paşa voices his concern that his sekbân troops
(irregulars)  defending  Belgrade  were  unreliable  because  Kara  Feyzi’s  agents  were
among  their  ranks  persuading  them  to  join  their  network.  However,  the  paşa’s
correspondence concomitantly betrays that he withheld the pay of his men and refused
to allow them to return to their homes when their contracts ended in order to prevent
them from joining the bandits. These imperial policies would only back-fire time and
time again and encourage his various types of auxiliary soldiery to join Kara Feyzi’s
bands.13 Similar to the Kara Kadı  option that Deli Mustafa alludes to, Mustafa Paşa’s
comments underline Kara Feyzi’s recurrent contact and negotiations with low-ranking
warriors who were supposed to protect local communities from him but elected to join
him  either  because  of  the  ill-treatment  of  their superiors  or  because  Kara  Feyzi’s
enterprise promised them a more lucrative deal or access to plunder.
17 Rather than trying to confirm or negate the truth of the claims of someone like Deli
Mustafa or those officials reporting on Kara Feyzi who were often in cahoots with him,
one can instead view the idiom of “unemployment” or “deceit” as an “ideological” tool-
box shared by irregular soldiery that could help explain away individual  as well  as
collective insubordination and violence. As Herzfeld points out with regard to highland
shepherds in modern Crete, the poetic effect of introducing a narrative with allusions
to  hunger  or  some  other  conventionalized  form  of  deprivation  to  explain  violent
behavior is precisely to identify the warrior’s condition with that of larger society and
to divert attention on the manly qualities of the act itself (Herzfeld 1985: 22). Men like
Deli Mustafa are not simply lying when they talk about their deprivations. It is this
imbalance  between  the  limited  power  and  financial  means  of  what  appear  to  be
whimsical  paşas and their dependence on irregulars like Mustafa to carry out their
commissions that engenders the symbolism of unemployment. As Herzfeld suggests,
perhaps a better word would be “dissatisfaction”—the dissatisfaction that both creates
insubordination and becomes its most characteristic expression (id., ibid.). To military
laborers, one of the true marks of manhood was the ability to hold one’s head high in
the face of adversity and repression that they came to expect from their commanders.
This entails a high level of awareness of the implications of official rhetoric and an
ability to mock and parody it both on the part of the irregulars and their superiors who
very well knew that the former would prey upon subjects once they were tricked out of
their pay.
18 This rhetoric of victimhood and deprivation, however,  should not be interpreted in
terms  of  class  or  social  oppositions,  strategies  of  resistance,  or  as  the  so-called
“weapons  of  the  weak,”  because  even  though  he  carefully  distances  himself  from
outright  “rebellious  behavior”  that  he  attributes  only  to  rebel  paşas  (fermânlı)  and
common criminals (harâmî), Deli Mustafa does hint that the vast networks of irregulars
to which he belonged could be very ruthless—and very organized—in their dealings
with imperial officials who double-crossed them.14 For instance, sometime in 1816 the
aforementioned Baba Paşa contracted Deli Mustafa and his companions to travel to the
Georgian borderland in the retinues of a certain Yegan Paşa and bölükbaşı (leader of
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irregular forces) Mahmud Kiran to lay siege to the fortress of Ahıska occupied by a paşa
who was declared an outlaw by Istanbul (Schmidt 2002: 189-191).15 After completing
this mission, the narrator reports that while they were awaiting further orders from
their  commander,  they  obtained news from informants  that  the  inhabitants  of  the
region had lodged complaints against Baba Paşa and his men to the sultan because his
forces had allegedly deflowered no less  than 500 local  girls  and decapitated several
thousand  Ahıskans  in  the  process  of  fighting  the  aforementioned  rebellious  paşa.
Noteworthy is  how Deli  Mustafa is  careful  to distance this  violence—the very same
ritualistic  and sexual  violence he hinted at  in the Greek context—from himself  and
attribute it only to other divisions of Baba Paşa’s forces.
19 But as a consequence of this intelligence and new developments, the author informs his
audience that Baba Paşa was dismissed and ordered to assume a new post in Diyarbakir,
which prompted Deli Mustafa and presumably thousands of other irregulars to rush
back to Erzurum in order to collect their pay before the paşa skipped town for his new
post. Baba Paşa, however, managed to weasel his way out of Erzurum without paying
his men, and this prompted Deli Mustafa’s bölükbaşı Mahmud Kıran and others whom
the  narrator  strategically  labels  as  “mischievous  soldiers”  to  assault  Baba  Paşa’s
remaining hârem and possessions in Erzurum. Even though he again distances himself
from the violence his comrades visited upon Baba Paşa’s intimate relations/kin, Deli
Mustafa nevertheless betrays the fact that he and his companions later joined forces
with Mahmud Kiran after the Baba Paşa hârem incident (Schmidt 2002: 193-194). Thus,
one  can  surmise  that  it  was  his  consistent  concern  for  portraying  himself  as  an
honorable warrior that dictated his circumspection. In other instances not involving
Muslim officials’  womenfolk, however, Deli Mustafa is much more explicit about his
and his comrades’ marching against commanders who conned them out of their pay
and physically threatening them, thus pointing to how pacts of honor gone awry could
backfire for the powerful as well as subordinate at any given moment.16
20 This  reported  attack  on  the  paşa’s  hârem suggests  that  just  like  the  Greek  rebels
Ottoman imperial elites could also be subject to the ultimate disgrace of having their
womenfolk dishonored by Ottoman irregulars if they double-crossed the wrong men.
As everyone involved in such an encounter understood, to harm, abuse, or abduct an
enemy or his  dependents—with the unstated presumption of  using them for sex or
slavery—was to level the greatest assault on his political honor: the violation of his
household became symbolic of his failure to defend his domain and his dependents. As
Leslie Peirce points out for earlier periods, the profit derived from abduction was more
than symbolic.  While  taking captive  bodies  could be  specifically  aimed at  inflicting
dishonor, abduction typically accompanied other forms of theft and usurpation: part of
the mystique of abduction and the fear it  provoked was the lucrative violence that
surrounded  it  (Peirce  2011:  312-3).  In  fact,  Peirce  argues  that  the  “cult”  of  royal
abduction intersected with the very self-fashioning of the Ottoman palace itself: as long
as  the  Empire  remained  successful  in  conquering  new  territories  and  was  led  by
warrior sultans of legendary prowess, the cult of abduction was a “positive force” for
the honor and reputation of the Ottoman sultanate. However, it gradually turned into
an act  that  threatened the  state’s  authority  late in  the  sixteenth century once  the
imperial  armies  were  no  longer  able  to  conquer  new  territories  and  politically
ambiguous strongmen within society targeted the sultan’s subjects and used abduction
The Precarious Intimacy of Honor in Late Ottoman Accounts of Para-militarism ...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 18 | 2014
8
as an assertion of honor, power, and valor against the sultan’s vision of order (Peirce
2011: 311-8).
 
Precarious Intimacy: Conflicting Loyalties, Deception,
and “Licit” Practice
21 Studying the sources documenting Kara Feyzi’s long insurgency reveals that in addition
to recruiting and coercing common Muslims and Christians into joining his network, he
would also attract some of the most eminent imperial  officials who hailed not only
from Rumeli or Istanbul but also from far away regions across the Empire into joining
his plundering confederacy. Indeed, here—in addition to their very different audiences
—lies  the  fundamental  difference  between  Deli  Mustafa’s  narrative  and  the  larger
corpus  of  correspondence  about  Kara  Feyzi.  Nevertheless,  some  important
congruencies  are  discernible.  The former’s  narrative  blames treacherous  paşas  who
abandoned Deli Mustafa and his comrades for their having to plunder subjects to make
a living. With this narrative device he probably not only ingratiated himself to like-
minded audiences of irregular soldiers sitting around campfires listening to his stories
but also helped them collectively explain their contentious ways. Similarly, the larger
corpus  of  sources  written  about  Kara  Feyzi  by  different  actors  reveals  common
strategies  in  how imperial  elites  who became embroiled  in  his  lucrative  enterprise
came to explain to more august audiences, the sultan and Imperial Council, their own
comprising  behavior  and  symbiotic  relations  with  Kara  Feyzi.  Inevitably,  imperial
grandees resorted to abduction tropes, claiming that they were abducted by evil men
(erbâb-ı  ser‘)  like  Kara  Feyzi,  “seduced”  by  these  tricksters’  (hîle-kâr)  power  and
promises, and then forced to terrorize and plunder the sultan’s subjects against their
will.
22 This section will therefore discuss how imperial elites involved in the Kara Feyzi saga
gradually  went  from  feeling  it  incumbent  upon  themselves  to  at  least  maintain  a
semblance  of  protecting  and  acting  honorably  vis-à-vis  Ottoman  subjects  in  their
interactions with bandit networks to no longer having to keep up such appearances as
Kara Feyzi’s insurgency expanded in scope over the years. In the early years of Kara
Feyzi’s  insurgency,  imperial  and local  elites portrayed their respective retinues and
collective behavior as bound by honor, probity, as well as fidelity to the faith and state.
However, they would ultimately come to participate consistently and openly in this
network’s lucrative enterprise with little damage to their reputations and careers. They
pursued their own agendas such as building powerful military retinues comprised of
the very bandits they were supposed to repel in order to exhort more resources from
both local communities and the imperial center as well as ensure that the retinues of
other powerful figures did not threaten their interests. The fact that Kara Feyzi could
forge increasingly intimate ties with the Empire’s most powerful elites suggests that
recalcitrant behavior became customary for many different groups of Ottoman society,
high  and  low.  For  their  own  part,  elite  officials  would  consistently  explain  such
behavior to the sultanate by employing abduction narratives similar to Deli Mustafa’s
unemployment trope in that they consistently served the same exculpatory function
for their collective behavior. This section will discuss how different groups in society
used the discourse of honor and its relational components to mediate social relations
and negotiate status with surprising levels of parity. As I argue, this stemmed from
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officials’ precarious dependency upon and intimacy with networks of violence like Kara
Feyzi’s to police and defend the Empire. 
23 Kara  Feyzi’s  rapid  ascension  onto  the  imperial  stage  as  a  broker  of  power  on  an
imperial scale came around 1797-8, after years of successfully plundering large parts of
Rumeli from Ottoman Serbia in the west to the very gates of Istanbul in the east. In fact,
his  interactions  with high-ranking officials  charged with the contradictory tasks  of
repelling and co-opting him and his vast network became increasingly intimate after
an  incident  that  took  place  in  Filibe  in  September 1797.The  incident  brought  the
Empire’s  most  prominent  ministers,  the  Governor  of  Rumeli,  Mustafa  Paşa,  and
Governor of Anatolia, Seyyid Ali Paşa, into a head-on clash over the strategy regarding
how  the  imperial  government  should  best  deal  with  Kara  Feyzi’s  menace—by
cooptation  or  outright  extermination.  While  Mustafa  Paşa  advocated  the  former
approach and at that very moment was negotiating with Kara Feyzi his cooptation into
his  retinue,  his  counterpart  insisted  upon  the  latter,  and  attacked  Kara  Feyzi’s
demobilized band in the middle of negotiations. In a furious exchange of dispatches
between the vezîrs and the sultan over this incident the two paşas attacked each other’s
character, loyalty to the state and faith, and ability to deal with the endemic problem of
banditry in the Empire.
24 Though I deal with this encounter and its consequences at length elsewhere, here I
would like to explore the role of honor in mediating one’s standing in imperial politics
and how it was harnessed by these respective actors. Mustafa Paşa was well aware of
Kara Feyzi’s penchant for reneging on the promises he made to imperial officials in the
past.17 However, in light of this scandal and the threat Seyyid ‘Ali Paşa posed to his
reputation both locally and in Istanbul, portraying Kara Feyzi and his companions as
trustworthy men served his goal of undermining his opponent. Kara Feyzi and his men
were described as sincerely pleading for mercy and on the verge of being successfully
rehabilitated as dependable servants (bende) who would conduct themselves henceforth
with  honor  and  decorum  in  the  paşa’s  administration  (“...müstâfır  olup  kendü  ‘ırz  ü
edebleriyle  dâ’ire-yi  hâlisânemizde edâ-yı  hidmet...”).  According to his  testimony,  it  was
Seyyid  ‘Ali  Paşa  and  his  Anatolian  troops’  cowardly,  unsanctioned  violence  that
fumbled what would have been Mustafa Paşa’s successful cooptation of this notorious
network.
25 In  conjunction with trying to  portray Kara Feyzi  and his  companions as  honorable
victims in this affair to suit his own agenda, Mustafa Paşa also conveys the shame
(haclet-i ‘azîm) that Seyyid ‘Ali Paşa’s intervention into local affairs and unauthorized
use of force brought to his own reputation in Rumeli. The inhabitants of the city had
heard that the followers of Kara Feyzi and his companions were actually pardoned,
given amnesty, and even employed by the Governor of Rumeli,  yet the Governor of
Anatolia  attacked  these  men  along  with  innocent  bystanders  regardless,  rendering
Mustafa Paşa’s word of honor void. Mustafa Paşa even cites the alleged speech of Kara
Feyzi himself to comment on Seyyid ‘Ali Paşa’s honor, pointing out how the latter’s
soldiers cravenly attacked wounded men who could not defend themselves and then
proceeded to  rob,  slaughter,  and burn down the  homes  of  local  inhabitants  in  the
process,  thus conveying how the local  community  felt  that  they endured collateral
damage as a result of what appeared a breach of honor.
26 For his own part, Seyyid ‘Ali Paşa expressed his great shame at being reproached by the
sultan  and  ordered  to  return  back  to  Anatolia  without  fulfilling  his  exclusive
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commission (together with an army of 10,000 men) of  destroying Kara Feyzi—all  on
account of his peer’s specious reports about his conduct. Ali Paşa argued that Mustafa
Paşa  was  both  unable  to  control  these  bandits  and  that  his  administration  was  in
cahoots  with  them.  Both  ministers’  careers,  nevertheless,  soon declined  and ended
fatally because of their dealings with Kara Feyzi’s larger networks, whereas, Kara Feyzi
and his companions lived and plundered on having gained new visibility through this
incident and profited from the imperial army’s evacuation from Rumeli to meet the
challenge of Napoleon’s army in Egypt in the summer of 1798.18
27 As this  incident suggests,  in the early years  of  Kara Feyzi’s  insurgency,  vezîrs  were
concerned  with  upholding  their  reputations  in  their  constituent  retinues  and
surrounding communities since they could be subject to public shame and disgrace for
failing to uphold their  words of  honor,  even when they were given to high profile
bandit leaders. In contrast, bandit leaders like Kara Feyzi were immune to this shame
and disgrace and seemed only to boost their reputations by breaking their promises
and consistently duping local and imperial officials. In this sense, one can see not only
how  different  groups  were  held  to  different  criteria  revolving  around  conflicting
notions of honorable behavior based on class and status but also how disparate groups
from below could manipulate elites into compromising situations whilst legitimating
their own contentious ways (Stewart 2001). On dozens of occasions Kara Feyzi broke
promises, feigned his willingness to betray companions, and even had his men continue
to pillage an area so that he could have more leverage when negotiating with local
leaders, yet the local populace consistently cooperated with him and his men because
of the coercive power that his organization wielded over local society.19
28 What would become most alarming from the perspective of Istanbul, however, is that
very soon after the Filibe scandal other high-ranking officials began to maraud and
pillage Rumeli openly alongside Kara Feyzi’s network thereby eliminating the need to
maintain a semblance of  acting honorably vis-à-vis  the sultan’s  vision of  order and
subjects.  On 23 June 1799,  for example,  a report reached Istanbul that another vezîr 
commissioned to  destroy  Kara  Feyzi,  the  Governor  of  Adana  Hüseyin  Paşa,  had  no
scruples  about  openly  joining  Kara  Feyzi’s  network  in  pillaging  and  slaughtering
communities between the cities of Edirne and Kırca‘ali. He apparently decided on this
course of action upon hearing news that he would have to return to Anatolia because of
his retinue’s ineffectiveness in fighting Kara Feyzi’s network (HH 2930). According to
the report, in his negotiations with the Porte Hüseyin Paşa—like Seyyid ‘Ali Paşa and
others after him—demanded that rather than being ordered back to the Arab provinces
disgraced and empty-handed, he should be promoted to the position of the Governor of
Rumeli (ibid.). It appears from the records that Ottoman elites could pursue the tactics
of joining the bandits with little damage to their track record in Istanbul, thus sending
out the message to all groups of society that crime did, indeed, pay very well.20
29 One of the central exculpatory devices in the rehabilitation negotiations between the
renegade vezîr and the central government in Istanbul was the hackneyed abduction
narrative in which the vezîrs sought to explain to the sultan their choice of openly
terrorizing Ottoman subjects alongside Kara Feyzi. For instance, another fallen vezîr,
Koşancalı Halil Paşa, forged a long relationship with Kara Feyzi’s network, pillaging for
years regions throughout Rumeli stretching from northern Serbia along the Danube
where they initially met to Greece and even the outskirts of Istanbul in the southeast
by  1803.  Among  a  number  of  sources  that  address  Kara  Feyzi  and  Koşancalı’s
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relationship,  a  couple  of  related  documents  written  in  the  winter  of  1801  are
particularly noteworthy. The first one dated 20 January 1801 was a dispatch that the
Edirne Bostancıbaşı sent to Tayyar Mahmud Paşa, the Governor of Trabzon, who was
another  Anatolian  vezîr commissioned  to  come  to  southern  Rumeli  to  disband  and
destroy Kara Feyzi’s network (HH 2436). The official reports that though Kara Feyzi and
his  companion Kara  Mustafa  were  still  devastating  the  Filibe  region,  the  two were
simultaneously sending in pleas for amnesty as well as the permission to remain there
permanently in exchange for promising to reform their dishonorable ways (ibid.). The
bostancıbaşı adds, however, that he indicated to them that in order to receive pardon,
this time they would have to kill their high-ranking companion Koşancalı Halil Paşa
themselves and personally deliver his “wretched head” to him (ibid.).
30 Another 9 February 1801 dispatch written by the same official, however, reports that in
a separate interview Halil Paşa had a very different story to tell about his companions:
he  claimed that  he  was  “wounded with  fear  for  his  life”  because  of  the  lying  and
slander of these malicious men (...erbâb-ı garaz ifk ve iftirâsından nâşî cânımın havfından
mecrûh olduğum...) (HH 3388C). He asserts that he was “taken captive” (girif-târ) by these
men and  forced  to  serve  deep  among their  ranks  while  he  was  still  a  vezîr of  the
Sublime  Porte  and  that  faced  with  such  a  helpless  state  of  abandonment  he  was
prevented from making amends for his previous string of crimes in Belgrade and forced
to roam together with these bandits throughout Rumeli against his better judgment.
According to the author of this report, Halil Paşa even pledged to betray Kara Feyzi and
his companions if Tayyar Paşa could only trick them into leaving with him to Anatolia
under his employ so that they could set up an ambush, but as was the case with many
other  similar  stratagems  that  involved  duping  Kara  Feyzi,  such  a  plan  never
materialized.21 Being tricked by Kara Feyzi,  whom officials often labeled a trickster,
became a chronically viable excuse for their compromising behavior.22
 
Conclusion
31 A common feature of the interactions of different groups discussed in this essay is that
though they were of varying social status, all of them were trying to fashion themselves
as honorable men in dishonorable times. The manipulation of the discourse of honor
and its relational components—shame, reputation, loyalty, and probity—governed how
powerful groups capable of wielding brutal force with impunity interacted with one
another  in  Ottoman society.  This  paper  also  argued  that  in  tumultuous  times  that
coincided with momentous historical events (e.g., the combined effects of widespread
disorder due to chronic inter-imperial wars, Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt, or the Greek
Revolution),  the  perception  of  what  constituted  honorable  behavior  and  decorum
changed—again pointing to the danger of imagining honor as a timeless discourse and
social structure.
32 It was the flexible, ambiguous discourse of honor that helped mediate relations in lieu
of  Islamic  (shari‘a)  or  sultanic  (kanûn)  law  whose  prescriptive  injunctions  and
jurisdictions were not conceived to combat large scale paramilitary/bandit networks
that  operated  as  trans-regional  organizations  that  preyed  upon  and  disciplined
Ottoman society.23 No local judge and his juridical tool-box could punish such large
organizations. It was the proscriptive, fluid manner of custom and honor that dictated
how  different  centers  of  power  interacted  with  one  another  as  well  as  local
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communities. Herein lay the contradictions of the state’s precarious relationship with
trans-regional networks of violence to police and defend its society. The state armed
and depended on these groups to fight its wars and man its policing apparatuses in the
retinues  of  governors  and  other  officials,  and  yet,  it  tacitly  acknowledged  that  a
majority  of  these  high-ranking  officials  institutionalized  deceiving  and  mistreating
these  same  men  when  it  came  to  paying  and  provisioning  for  them.  The  imperial
center,  therefore,  naturally  found  itself  in  a  compromised  position  vis-à-vis  these
cheap but lethal military organizations that could prey upon and terrorize Ottoman
subjects and officials alike for sustenance and leverage. Deli Mustafa’s self-narrative
sheds light on how individual  members of  these vast  paramilitary orders fashioned
themselves and their behavior vis-à-vis other groups of society; however, the corpus of
sources  written  about  Kara  Feyzi  provides  us  with  a  much  larger  interpretative
community  that  integrates  smaller  voices  like  Mustafa’s  or  local  administrators’
writing about Kara Feyzi together with the voices of the most powerful men in the
Empire.
33 What  these  combined  encounters  point  to  is  how  ubiquitous  the  state  was  in  the
politics of honor on the ground. In their discussions of twentieth-century communities
in the Mediterranean region anthropologists stressed that honor was a particular mode
of communal interaction in the absence of moderating state institutions. Indeed, one of
the most common criticisms of twentieth-century scholarship on the anthropology of
honor and shame is that they were values mostly of country bumpkins living in rural,
isolated mountain communities, and therefore, not representative of a so-called unity
that anthropologists used by framing honor as a common denominator for the entire
Mediterranean  region.  Case  studies  presented  throughout  this  paper,  however,  all
straddle the rural and urban divide and show how the discourse of honor was part of a
trans-regional,  customary forum in which all  groups had to participate to negotiate
material and symbolic resources.
34 Recently, historians of the early-modern Ottoman and Venetian Empires working on
misogyny and abduction have reinserted the state into the discussion of honor. It has
been argued that the sexual economy that tainted their victims, kin, and community
also threatened the ruler  himself  by subjecting him to larger complaints  about the
integrity and legitimacy of imperial rule in general, and thus, concomitantly tainted his
honor.  For  instance,  Başak  Tuğ’s  contribution  to  this  journal  issue  points  to  how
specific  types  of  eighteenth-century  sources  such  as  complaint  registers  (şikâyet
defterleri) verify how men and women themselves were adept at manipulating notions
of dishonor (hetk-i ‘ırz) committed against womenfolk by local strongmen to persuade
the central government to move against men that threatened their common interests.
However, in the large corpus of sources24 written about Kara Feyzi that demanded the
immediate attention of the imperial council and the sultan, violence against and the
abduction of women were not the primary concerns of males high and low writing
about Kara Feyzi’s operation. Rather, these were gendered documents that reveal men
across  the  social  spectrum:  vociferously  defending  their  reputations,  loyalty,  and
integrity  whilst  slandering  those  of  others;  staunchly  fighting  for  vast  material
resources,  weapons,  commodities,  and  men;  and  insolently  explaining  away  their
compromising behavior with common tropes and phrases.  In other words, although
many of the men discussed in this essay were the usual culprits of misogyny, it is rather
the awesome repertoire of crime and violence that accompanied sexual violence that
reveals  how  honor  and  its  relational  components  really  mediated  social  relations
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among  disparate  groups  of  powerful  men  and  different  centers  of  power  that
dominated Ottoman society. The discourse of honor informed meso-level transactions
that mediated how material and symbolic resources were distributed in a society in
which most groups were tied to or affected by larger, trans-regional networks and their
markets  that  bolstered  what  was  still  a  sprawling  empire.  The  ubiquity  of  these
transactions questions the utility of talking about honor and shame as values that are
pertinent only to peripheries and borderlands of empires or nation-states, since both
Deli Mustafa as well as Kara Feyzi’s stories point to how networks of violence moved
throughout the Ottoman realm and exerted veritable power and influence whether they
roamed near Istanbul, eastern Anatolia, or the Balkans. 
35 What  Kara  Feyzi  and  Deli  Mustafa’s  combined  stories  demonstrate  is  that  the
relationship between real power (i.e., the ability to wield extreme force) in the hands of
sundry networks and the constant alternation between professed words of honor and
allegiance versus deception among different groups of society caught in this zero-sum
game  point  to  how  the  resource  of  honor  and  its  accompanying  discourses  had  a
“leveling affect” on social “class,” pedigree, and distinction that put actors of humble
social origins on par with elite actors.25 In other words, the rapid social mobility in
Ottoman society  based on one’s  ability  to  wield  force  points  to  how honor  and its
relational components was not a resource bound solely to social status and blood. Men
like Deli Mustafa and Kara Feyzi were adept at manipulating officially recognized forms
of protocol and decorum when they dealt with official representatives of the state.
36 While this essay focused on the moral communities of which Deli Mustafa, Kara Feyzi,
and their  interlocutors  were part,  at  the same time it  revealed the tensions of  the
heavily ideological, political, and historical relationships between their communities on
the one hand and the state and other encompassing entities on the other in order to
show how these groups did not understand Istanbul as their moral center (Herzfeld
1985:  20).  Their  strong  sense  of  distinctive  community  shows  that  the  concentric
loyalties  that  marked Ottoman society did not  represent secessionist  threats  to the
state  per  se  but  offered  alternative  moral  visions  that  justified,  and  valued,
insubordinate  behavior  and  inventive  ways  of  disobedience  (ibid.:  xii-xvi).  It  is  the
precarious intimacy of the encounter of these groups and the fact that they were all
held to  conflicting standards  of  decorum and behavior  yet  placed on equal  footing
because of  their ability to wield shocking violence on the one hand and the state’s
reliance  on  this  violence  to  police  and  defend  its  society  on  the  other  that
insubordinate,  unconventional  behavior  became  conventionalized  as  a  marker  for
manhood across social classes and organizations throughout Ottoman society.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
 
The Precarious Intimacy of Honor in Late Ottoman Accounts of Para-militarism ...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 18 | 2014
14
Non-Published Works
B.O.A. Hatt-ı Hümâyûn (HH), 2402C, 2930, 2436, 3388C.
Ms. Or. 1551. Leiden University Library.
 
Published Works
Abu-Lughod, Lila (1986) Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society, Los Angeles,
University of California.
Ahmet Cevdet Paşa (h.1309 [1891-2]) Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. X, Der-sa‘âdet
Aksan, Virginia H. (2007) The Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged, Harlow, Pearson /
Longman.
Albera, Dionigi (2006) ‘Anthropology of the Mediterranean: Between Crisis and Renewal’, History
and Anthropology 17 (2), pp. 109-133, URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02757200600633272.
Anscombe, Frederick F. (2006) ‘Albanians and “mountain bandits”’, in Anscombe, Frederick F.
(ed.), The Ottoman Balkans, 1750-1830, Princeton NJ, Markus Wiener Publishers, pp. 87-113, URL: 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/578/1/578.pdf.
Bracewell, Catherine Wendy (1992) The Uskoks of Senj: Piracy, Banditry, and Holy War in the Sixteenth-
Century Adriatic, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press.
Campbell, John K. (1964) Honour, Family, and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a
Greek Mountain Community, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Esmer, Tolga Uğur (2009) A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discourses of
Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790-1808, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Chicago, University of Chicago.
Esmer, Tolga Uğur (2014a) ‘Economies of Violence, Banditry and Governance in the Ottoman
Empire around 1800’, Past & Present 224, pp. 163-199.
Esmer, Tolga Uğur (2014b) ‘The Confessions of an Ottoman “Irregular”: Self-Representation and
Ottoman Interpretive Communities in the Nineteenth Century’, Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi – The
Journal of Ottoman Studies 44 (forthcoming).
Herzfeld, Michael (1984) ‘The Horns of the Mediterraneanist Dilemma’, American Ethnologist 11 (3),
pp. 439-54, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/644625.
Herzfeld, Michael (1985) The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain Village, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Horden, Peregrine; Purcell, Nicholas (2000) ‘“I Also Have a Moustache:” Anthropology and
Mediterranean Unity’, in Horden, Peregrine; Purcell, Nicholas, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of
Mediterranean History, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 485-529.
Krstić, Tijana (2011) Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early Modern
Ottoman Empire, Stanford CA, Stanford University Press.
Manolova-Nikolova, Nadja; Zheleva, Penka (ed.) (1999), Летописни бележки от средна западна 
България, XVI-XX век [Notes in Chronicles from Central-Western Bulgaria], Sofia, Lik.
Nachev, Ventseslav; Fermandjiev, Nikola (ed.) (1984) Писахме да се знае: приписки и летописи
[We Wrote to Let it Be Known: Marginalia and Chronicles], Sofia, Otechestvenija Front.
The Precarious Intimacy of Honor in Late Ottoman Accounts of Para-militarism ...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 18 | 2014
15
Peirce, Leslie (2011) ‘Abduction with (Dis)honor: Sovereigns, Brigands, and Heroes in the
Ottoman World’, Journal of Early Modern History 15 (4), pp. 311-29, URI: http://dx.doi.org/
10.1163/157006511X577005.
Peristiany, John G. (ed.) (1965), Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society, London,
Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Pina-Cabral, João (1989) ‘The Mediterranean as a Category of Regional Comparison: A Critical
View’, Current Anthropology 30 (3), pp. 399-406, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2743537.
Pitt-Rivers, Julian (1977) The Fate of Shechem or the Politics of Sex: Essays in the Anthropology of the
Mediterranean, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Sant Cassia, Paul (2006) ‘Better Occasional Murderers than Frequent Adulteries: Discourses on
Banditry, Violence, and Sacrifice in the Mediterranean’, in Coronil, Fernando; Skurski, Julie
(eds.), States of Violence, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, pp. 219-268.
Schmidt, Jan (2002) ‘The Adventures of an Ottoman Horseman: The Autobiography of Kabudlı
Vasfî Efendi, 1800-1825’, in Schmidt, Jan, The Joys of Philology: Studies in Ottoman Literature, History
and Orientalism (1500-1923) -I- Poetry, Historiography, Biography and Autobiography, Istanbul, İsis
Yayınları, pp. 167-286.
Smiley, Will (2012) ‘When Peace is Made, You will Again be Free:’ Islamic and Treaty Law, Black Sea
Conflict, and the Emergence of ‘Prisoners of War’ in the Ottoman Empire, 1739-1830, unpublished PhD.
Dissertation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Queens’ College.
Stewart, Charles (2001) ‘Honor and Shame’, in Smelser, Neil J.; Baltes Paul B. (ed.), International
Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavior Sciences, pp. 6904-6907, URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
B0-08-043076-7/00884-6.
Taylor, Scott (2011) ‘Honor in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean – an Introduction’, Journal
of Early modern History 15 (4), pp. 301-310, URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157006511X576998.
Tezcan, Baki (2010) The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern
World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
NOTES
1.  Leiden University Library,  Ms. Or. 1551.  The manuscript is  dated 22 zi’l-ka’de 1249 (April 2,
1834). It was translated into English and commented upon by J. Schmidt (2002). In this paper I
will be referring both to Schmidt’s translation and to the actual manuscript. I have chosen to
refer to the narrator as “Deli Mustafa” (which can also mean “Crazy Mustafa”) since he refers to
himself as such in the narrative as opposed to using the his embellished name (El-Haccî Vasfî
Efendi) signed at the beginning of the text. As I will discuss below, the authorship of this account
is in question.
2.  In terms of nomenclature for different types of military forces in Ottoman history, there were
many types of “irregular,” mercenary-like forces such as delis, sarıca, levend, sekbân, etc. that the
Ottomans used in warfare. For more on these types of forces, dubbed most recently as “military
laborers” by V. Aksan because of the blurry boundaries among these different categories,  see
(Aksan 2007).
3.  For more on Deli Mustafa’s narrative, see Esmer 2014b.
4.  For  more  on  Kara  Feyzi  and  how  his  insurgency  began  as  a  “legal”  punishment  against
rebellious Serbian and other Christian communities along the Danube, see Esmer 2014a.
5.  For comparisons, see Campbell 1964; Peristiany 1965; Pitt-Rivers 1977.
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6.  See in particular Horden, Purcell 2000.
7.  In this approach I am building on Herzfeld 1988. I am also in dialogue with Noemi Levy-Aksu’s
contribution to this edition, which approaches honor as both an individual and collective value
of inclusion and exclusion deeply connected to ideas about morality as well as loyalty to larger
networks and the state.
8.  The authorship of this account is in question, as one can see from the mixing of genres in Deli
Mustafa’s narrative as well as how he sometimes addresses his audience directly. These features
suggest that he most likely dictated a series of oral accounts over time to a scribe of limited
literacy, given the mistakes in syntax, spelling,  and word choice.  For more on Deli  Mustafa’s
narrative, the violence he describes in detail, and its overall meaning in Muslim interpretative
communities at the time, see Esmer 2014b.
9.  Being relegated to a simple foot soldier (piyâde) features as a common complaint or fear in
Mustafa’s narrative when he describes horses being stolen or shot beneath him. It seems that the
author took pride in being a deli as opposed to a foot soldier or volunteer (gönüllü), but at one
point, he hints that his leader was a volunteer leader (gönüller ağası).
10.  At one point after a battle, for instance, Deli Mustafa alludes to the fact that various groups
of soldiery would bring all of their mutilated trophies, booty, as well as bound Christian slaves to
line up before their superior officers to sell their loot and receive “bonuses” (Schmidt 2002: 261).
11.  Ottomanists working on the Balkans around this period have also noticed similar types of
negotiation strategies among itinerate warriors in the Balkans, groups often labeled collectively
as “Albanian.” See Anscombe2006: 95-102.
12.  Baki  Tezcan has  recently  made the  important  point  that  one  should  see  the  increasing
availability of mercenary-style irregular soldiery (e.g., sekbân) for inter- as well as intra-imperial
warfare starting in the late sixteenth century as a direct result of imperial fiscal policies and the
creation of a single currency zone (i.e.,  the “akçe zone”) that united markets from Yemen to
Hungary. That being said, while Tezcan’s analysis portrays these irregulars as commodities to be
bought and sold by Ottoman elites, this essay tries to study the other side of this picture, to show
how this big mass of irregulars that scholars discuss were also very organized networks that were
very adept at manipulating their status as “commodities” of the elite. See Tezcan 2010.
13.  Ibid. For more on these recurring dynamics in the Kara Feyzi saga, see Esmer 2014a.
14.  The fact that throughout the Kara Feyzi saga irregular and imperial soldiery consistently
abandoned their commanders and joined lucrative bandit enterprises on the other side of the
fortress walls only corroborates this.
15.  According to Schmidt, Cevdet calls this bölükbaşı [division leader] Mahmud Tiran. See Ahmet
Cevdet Paşa 1891-2, vol. X: 249.
16.  For  instance,  near  Erzincan  another  paşa,  a  certain  Hafız  ‘Ali  Paşa,  refused  to  pay  Deli
Mustafa and his fellow delis after their fulfilling their contracted services;  thus,  the narrator
claims that they organized and marched against the paşa and were successful in extracting their
pay through outright aggression. (Schmidt 2002: 198-199).  In another instance, Mustafa notes
that he had another quarrel (nizâ’ edüb) with a paşa on the Persian frontier in skirmishes with
Persian troops. Once the paşa cut off their monthly allowance, the irregulars were the ones who
abandoned him at Kars and left for Sivas. (Ibid.: 207).
17.  For more on sincerity, probity, and imperial versus bandit strategies at the negotiation table,
see Esmer 2014a.
18.  For more on the fates of these vezîrs in contrast to Kara Feyzi, see Esmer 2014a.
19.  For more on Kara Feyzi and his network’s surveillance, coercion, and access to vast amounts
of information that gave his organization pre-emptive striking abilities, see Esmer 2014a.
20.  Apparently, Hüseyin Paşa could act so boldly without any damage to his record, because he
was soon afterwards appointed to combat Napoleon’s forces in Egypt. See HH 2930.
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21.  Ibid. Noteworthy, is that the aforementioned Mustafa Paşa also convinced the sultan to order
Seyyid ‘Ali Paşa to take Kara Feyzi and his retinue back to Anatolia; however, Kara Feyzi and his
companions refused to fall for this trick.
22.  For more examples of other vezîrs’ and paşas’ making such claims, see Esmer 2014a.
23.  For more on the limits of law in dealing with large-scale crime, see Başak Tuğ’s contribution
in this EJTS issue.
24.  For example, hatt-ı hümâyûn, cevdet dahiliye, cevdet ‘adliye, mühimme defterleri, etc. but not sicil 
defterleri (court records) or şikâyet defterleri.
25.  Like Peristiany, Pitt-Rivers, and Campbell writing before her, Abu-Lughod (1986) also saw
blood  and  pedigree  as  critical  to  a  person’s  honor  and  worth.  Blood,  she  argued,  is  the
authenticator of origin or pedigree and as such is crucial to Bedouin identity, and ‘asl, ancestry or
nobility, is a crucial component in the “honor code.” In the terms usually translated as honor,
i.e., sharaf (şerif in Turkish), are implied a cluster of values that a morally excellent man is likely
to have inherited: generosity, honesty, sincerity, keeping one’s world of honor and loyalty to
friends and family.  In contrast,  Peregrine Horden and Nicholas  Purcell’s  work on honor and
social relations questions such oppositions. See (Horden, Purcell 2000).
ABSTRACTS
This essay sets up a dialogue between the self-narrative of an irregular cavalryman (deli) Deli
Mustafa that recounts the campaigns he took part in between 1801/2 and 1825 and the corpus of
Ottoman archival  sources  written  about  Kara  Feyzi,  an  irregular  soldier  (sekbân)  and  bandit
leader  who  marshaled  a  successful,  trans-regional  organized  crime  network  that  pillaged
Ottoman Rumeli from 1793 to 1823. It does so in order to tell a larger story about how imperial
governance came to depend on wide-spread networks of violence for defending and policing the
Empire but became imbricated in their criminal activities during this period of Ottoman history.
Together,  Kara Feyzi and Deli  Mustafa’s stories shed light on much larger interpretative and
moral  communities  forged  upon  the  same  kinds  of  “texts,”  narrative  strategies,  group
experiences, exchange of material and symbolic resources, or simply a concept like honor woven
throughout the narratives discussed below.
This  essay  builds  on  recent  historiography  that  revisits  honor  as  a  discourse  that  imperial
officials, subjects, warriors, irregulars, and bandits all invoked in everyday relations as well as
crisis. Rather than emphasizing honor as the mechanism of social organization in the absence of
the  reaches  of  the  modern  state  as  it  featured  in  twentieth-century  anthropology  of  the
Mediterranean, this essay illuminates the ways in which the discourse of honor (and its relational
components) mediated the integration of individuals, groups, and local communities into much
larger entities such as trans-regional networks and structures of the state. As it will be argued,
the reliance of imperial governance on the trans-regional networks of violence to police and
defend  empire  resulted  in  a  precarious  intimacy  that  conventionalized  the  unconventional,
insubordinate behavior of vast echelons of Ottoman society, making violent behavior a marker of
prestige and masculine aesthetic—indeed an enduring legacy of the Ottoman past from Serbia to
Syria.
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